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aBStract 
This paper examines the tax policy convergence in the EU-15 during 
the period 1965-2005 using a time series approach. The main purpose is 
to assess the convergence of the main components of tax revenue -income 
and profits, social security contributions, property, general taxes on goods 
and services, taxes on specific goods and services- taking as references 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the European average. The analysis is 
carried out from two complementary perspectives: the tax burden and the 
tax structure. Using unit roots and stationarity tests with a structural change, 
and also analyzing β-convergence, the results show little evidence of tax 
convergence. Convergence appears with similar intensity with respect to the 
three benchmarks, and in the years previous to the structural break which, in 
general, was situated endogenously at the end of the 1980s or at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Moreover, tax convergence is basically centred on income and 
profits, and goods and services taxation. The empirical evidence shows that 
the autonomy of the countries, their different economic structures and political 
preferences regarding the degree of public intervention, prevail over the idea 
of fiscal equalization in the EU.  
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rESumEn
En este trabajo se analiza la convergencia de la política impositiva en la UE-
15 en el periodo 1965-2005 mediante un enfoque de series temporales. El 
principal objetivo es contrastar la convergencia de los principales componentes 
de los ingresos tributarios –renta y beneficios, contribuciones a la seguridad 
social, propiedad, impuestos generales sobre bienes y servicios, impuestos 
específicos sobre bienes y servicios- tomando como referencias Alemania, 
Reino Unido y la media europea. El análisis se realiza desde dos perspectivas 
complementarias: la presión fiscal y la estructura impositiva. Mediante 
contrastes de raíz unitaria y de estacionariedad con cambio estructural, y 
analizando la condición de beta convergencia, los resultados muestran poca 
evidencia de convergencia fiscal. La convergencia se presenta con similar 
intensidad con respecto a las tres referencias y en los años previos a la ruptura 
endógena que, en general, se sitúa a finales de los 80 y comienzos de los 90. 
Además, la convergencia se centra básicamente en la imposición sobre renta 
y beneficios y bienes y servicios. La evidencia empírica muestra por tanto que 
la autonomía de los países, sus estructuras económicas diferenciadas y las 
preferencias políticas sobre el grado de intervención pública prevalecen sobre 
la idea de igualdad fiscal en la UE.  
Palabras clave: Convergencia; Unión Europea; Política impositiva; Series 
temporales.
 JEL Classification: C22, E62, H87.
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1 . introduction1
In the context of the progressive economic integration in the European 
Union, the study of the convergence has been the focus of a broad empirical 
literature in the last two decades by analysing per capita income, productivity 
or price indexes. In this integration process the Maastricht criteria refer only to 
nominal requisites, including prices and interest rates. About the measures of 
the public sector, only deficit and debt are contemplated among the criteria2. 
However, the convergence of the fiscal systems deserves a specific analysis in 
light of the existence of policies of fiscal harmonization and some degree of tax 
competition, especially in capital income. This convergence can be addressed 
from several perspectives, and we focus on two: the convergence of the tax 
burden (total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP) and the convergence of 
the tax structure (the components of tax structure as a percentage of total 
tax revenue). We carry this out with a disaggregated analysis of the main tax 
components using time series techniques. 
In a single market it is debatable from a theoretical point of view whether 
there should be equalization of the tax burden among Member States (Emerson 
et al., 1992). Tax-coordination as tool for avoiding very distinct policies, and 
tax-harmonization in the sense of an equalization of effective tax rates, have 
been debated since the beginning of the process of European integration. 
Due to the existence of differences in economic structures and political 
preferences, along with national fiscal autonomy, European tax systems are far 
from uniform. Our aim is to investigate the issue of tax convergence from an 
empirical perspective.
Though a large literature exists on the convergence of public expenditure, 
both in terms of its size as its composition3, the available literature on the topic 
1 An earlier version was presented at the XVIth Meeting on Public Economics (Granada, 2009). The 
authors thank the comments and suggestions from Miguel Sánchez Villalba, Alan Wall and two anony-
mous referees.
2 Alonso and Cendejas (2006) study the role of the business cycle in the convergence process of both 
ratios in the EMU.
3 See for example Kautto and Kvist (2002), Bouget (2003) and Ganghof (2006) for welfare systems; 
and Sanz and Velázquez (2004 and 2006) and Skidmore et al. (2004) for expenditure composition.
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of tax convergence in EU is relatively small4. Using a cross-section approach, 
Esteve et al. (1999) and Sosvilla et al. (2001) study beta and sigma convergence 
and Delgado (2009) analyses gamma convergence5. In the present study, 
however, we use a time series setting which permits an individualized study 
of every country. Previous studies using time series analysis are Esteve et al. 
(1999 and 2000) and Delgado and Presno (2007). Esteve et al. (1999) study 
the tax burden using the six main subdivisions of the OECD tax classification for 
1967-1994. By using unit root tests with a change, and taking Germany as the 
benchmark, they reject the hypothesis of long-run convergence but they find 
catching-up for some countries and tax categories. Esteve et al. (2000) repeat 
the exercise for the total tax burden, finding long-run convergence for Austria 
and catching-up for Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Finally, Delgado and Presno (2007) study the total tax burden over 
the period 1965-2004 taking several benchmarks and their results suggest a 
reduced number of convergence paths. 
Our main objective in this research is to study the disaggregated tax burden 
and to include the tax mix in the analysis in order to achieve a more complete 
vision of the process of fiscal convergence in the EU-15. We employ OECD data 
for the period 1965-2005, with Germany, the United Kingdom and the European 
average as benchmarks.6 The following tax components are considered: income, 
profits and capital gains; social security contributions; taxes on property; general 
taxes on goods and services; and taxes on specific goods and services. Taken 
together, these represent at present about 90 per cent of EU-15 tax revenue. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains 
the theoretical framework and the methodology, describing the definitions 
of convergence and the tests employed in the paper. The data and general 
results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 exhibits the detailed results 
and policy implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes. An Appendix contains 
a summary of test results. 
4 Slemrod (2004) analyses the corporate tax rates convergence and Boscá et al. (2005) study the 
convergence of the effective tax rates on consumption, capital and labour for the OECD countries.
5 Delgado (2009) also carries out a cluster analysis within the EU-15 with regard to the tax burden 
and tax structure to determine groups of countries with similar characteristics. In his study for 2005, 
Germany appears in the most numerous cluster, and the other four groups are formed by (i) Belgium, 
Finland and Sweden, (ii) Greece and Portugal, (iii) Ireland and the United Kingdom and (iv) Denmark.
6 While Germany is an obvious choice given its status as the EU largest economy, we also study the 
differences with respect to the United Kingdom due to its importance in the European economy and 
the peculiarities of its tax system. 
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2 . thEorEtical framEwork and mEthodoloGy . 
2 .1 . SomE iSSuES aBout taxation in Eu .
The increasing economic integration of the EU countries, epitomized by the 
constitution of the Single Market after 1992, provides an important framework 
for both theoretical and empirical study in the area of Public Economics, and 
more precisely in the Fiscal Federalism and Public Policy theories7.
Theoretically, countries compete for mobile factors in an integrated area with 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. Thus, in a convergence 
scenario, tax competition (for reviews, see Wilson, 1999 or Zodrow, 2003) 
could tend to equalize the tax burden and the tax mix. Another result from the 
globalization theory of taxation is that, as labour is less mobile than capital, it 
is expected that effective tax rates on labour increase, whereas effective tax 
rates on capital decrease, i.e. convergence towards the bottom8. The net result 
is that the tax structure will be more based on labour income, implying a shift 
in the tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases. However, in the real 
world the pressures of unemployment rates and other factors constrain the 
potential rise of labour taxation. 
Fiscal harmonization policies have been geared towards the convergence 
of tax systems in EU. However, relatively little harmonization has been 
achieved because the unanimity criterion requires a lot of effort and time 
to achieve agreements, slowing down tax integration. Swank and Steinmo 
(2002) argue that changes in tax burdens are constrained by three factors 
–internationalization, domestic economic change and budgetary forces– and 
they explain the complexity of tax policy outcomes in the framework of a “new 
political economy of taxation”9. 
Another issue is that the Member States do not have the same economic 
structures or public welfare systems. It is well-known that the Nordic welfare 
model is the most generous, with Denmark and Sweden facing a tax burden of 
over 50 per cent of GDP. On the other extreme, the tax to GDP ratios of Greece 
and Ireland are much lower than the EU average. Moreover, the introduction 
of the single currency in the euro zone has left national fiscal policy as the key 
stabilization tool for individual countries. 
In the context of EU integration, fiscal magnitudes are not the central task 
of the process. The harmonization rules in indirect taxation, based on minimum 
rates, and the slight agreement on capital incomes approved in recent years do 
7 For an exhaustive review of the literature on policy convergence, see Heichel et al. (2005). Holz-
inger (2006) contains an interesting discussion of the methodological problems of policy convergence 
studies. 
8 This can be seen as the result of the classic prisoner’s dilemma (Tanzi, 1995). In an extreme case 
of fully mobile capital in open economies, the optimal tax rate on capital income tends to be zero. 
However, real world data show that they are far from zero. On the other hand, Hays (2003) concludes 
that globalization will lead to partial capital tax convergence but not convergence to the bottom.   
9 For a more detailed discussion about internationalization and its effects on national policies, see for 
example Radaelli (1997), Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) and Drezner (2003).
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not constitute a “hard” and unique Union tax policy. Furthermore, the Maastricht 
criteria of entry into the EMU refer only to the public deficit and national debt, 
which must be below 3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP respectively.  
Finally, insofar as both the level of the tax burden and the tax mix have 
effects on economic growth and productivity, there is a need to study the 
differentials between the fiscal systems of the European countries, as well as 
their paths of convergence and divergence10. 
2 .2 . dEfinitionS of convErGEncE .
The literature on convergence from a time series perspective (Carlino and 
Mills, 1993; Quah, 1993; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Evans and Karras, 1996; 
Li and Papell, 1999) has given rise to three concepts –long run, deterministic 
and stochastic convergence or catching-up– which we briefly summarize below.
Long run or absolute convergence requires the equality of the long run 
predictions of the fiscal magnitudes, so the difference between the country 
and the benchmark must be a zero-mean stationary series. The strength of 
this restriction has meant that this kind of convergence, called “asymptotically 
perfect convergence” by Hobijn and Franses (2000), is not frequently 
confirmed.
Stochastic convergence or catching-up version refers to when the difference 
is stationary around a trend. However, this concept is compatible with 
permanent differences (Li and Papell, 1999), so we will label this “preliminary” 
stochastic convergence. Carlino and Mills (1993) point out that a condition 
of β-convergence must be confirmed as well to ensure the strengthening of 
the difference. Thus, “confirmed” stochastic convergence or simply stochastic 
convergence is attained when both preliminary stochastic convergence and 
β-convergence are verified.
Third, Li and Papell (1999) propose deterministic convergence as an 
intermediate concept between the previous two when the difference is stationary 
around a non-zero level, which is the same idea behind the “asymptotically 
relative convergence” of Hobijn and Franses (2000). Nevertheless, this is a weak 
concept of convergence as it permits important, though constant, differences 
between the series.   
 
10 For instance, see Mendoza et al. (1997) for a theoretical and empirical study on the relationship 
between tax policy and long-run growth, Tosun and Abizadeh (2005) for an empirical study of the 
relation between tax mix and economic growth, and Wang (2007) on the tax burden and growth, all 
of which are studies for the OECD countries. Lee and Gordon (2005) study the influence of tax struc-
ture on economic growth with a worldwide sample of 70 countries and they find a negative effect of 
the corporate tax rate on growth. In a more specific framework, Pintus (2008) analyses the relation-
ship between the progressiveness of income tax and the speed of convergence, finding that income 
convergence and tax progressiveness are positively correlated both for a US sample and a sample of 
six OECD countries (Italy, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and United States). Joumard 
(2002) contains an interesting review of tax policies in EU countries.
59
rEviSta dE Economía mundial 26, 2010, 53-83
tax Policy convErGEncE in Eu: an EmPirical analySiS
2 .3 . mEthodoloGical iSSuES .
As seen above, convergence analysis from a time series approach rests 
on the concept of stationarity, that is, on the idea that shocks only have a 
temporary effect due to the non-existence of a unit root in the process. With 
the aim of studying this stochastic time series property, in this paper we apply 
both unit root and stationarity tests as a means to reinforce the conclusions 
of both kinds of tests and to obtain robust results. The confirmatory analysis 
is summarized in Table 1 (Cheung and Chinn, 1996). While cases II and III 
lead to coincidental conclusions (no stationarity or “no convergence” and 
stationarity or “convergence”, respectively), the conclusions of the tests are 
contradictory in cases I and IV, imputable, respectively, to the deficient power 
of the tests under some circumstances and to the existence of more complex 
data generating processes.
taBlE 1: Summary of Joint rESultS from unit root and Stationarity tEStS .
Stationarity test:
Does not reject
Stationarity test:
Rejects
Unit root test: Does not reject CASE I (?) CASE II
Unit root test: Rejects CASE III CASE IV (?)
Source: Cheung and Chinn (1996).
As the period that we consider in our convergence analysis contains events 
of great relevance in fiscal terms (such as the adhesion of new Member States, 
the introduction of harmonization measures, the single market, the Maastricht 
criteria), we apply tests which allow a structural break taking place at a 
time unknown a priori11. Also, we consider four models. For the analysis of 
deterministic convergence, we use the Level Model (series without trend but 
with a change in level). When we extend our study to stochastic convergence, 
we consider three models with trend: Model A (series with a level shift), Model 
B (series with a change in the slope), and Model C (series with both a change 
in intercept and slope). Since the election of the model is relevant in order to 
correctly infer the properties of the time series, we estimated the three trended 
models and, following Montañés et al. (2005), opted for the one selected using 
the Schwarz criteria.
To perform the analysis, we applied the unit root statistic proposed by 
Perron and Rodríguez (2003). They extended the class of modified tests 
(M-tests) of Elliott et al. (1996) and Ng and Perron (2001) to the analysis of 
series which suffer a structural change in the trend function (Models B and C) 
at a time unknown a priori. Concretely, and paying attention to the properties 
11 It has been demonstrated in the unit root and stationarity tests literature (e.g. Perron, 1989, 1990 
and Lee et al., 1997) that the existence of breaks which are ignored carries low power in the Dickey-
Fuller test and strong distortions in the size of the LM stationarity test.
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 where k was selected according 
to the Modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC) considering kmax=5. As we 
treat the break point as unknown a priori, we applied the Infimum method to 
estimate it.
Finally, for the trending models (A, B and C) we used finite sample critical 
values provided by Rodríguez (2006a) and Perron and Rodríguez (2003). For 
the Level Model, we generated finite sample critical values adapted to our data 
sample size and adjusted for the effect of the method used to select k and for 
the procedure applied for estimating the change date13.
To complement this, we applied the LM stationarity test with a structural 
break, which was studied by Lee and Strazicich (2001), Busetti and Harvey 
(2001), Kurozumi (2002) or Presno and López (2003a).
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12 For the unit root and stationarity tests, we considered the following set of deterministic com-
ponents, zt, depending on the model: zt={1,1(t>Tb)} (Model Level), zt={1,1(t>Tb),t} (Model A), 
zt={1,t,1(t>Tb)(t-Tb)} (Model B), and zt={1,1(t>Tb),t,1(t>Tb)(t-Tb)} (Model C), where 1(.) is the indi-
cator function and Tb is the break date.
13 Perron and Rodríguez (2003) stress that the Level Model and Model A are special cases of the 
slowly evolving deterministic component (Elliott et al., 1996) and the asymptotic distributions of the 
tests coincide with the case whose deterministic components include a constant and a time trend 
respectively. However, for case A, Rodríguez (2006a) checks that in small samples there are big dif-
ferences with respect to the asymptotic behaviour and generates finite sample critical values. For 
the Level Model we generated them according to the following specifications: we did Monte Carlo 
experiments (5,000 replications) and generated series under the null hypothesis with T=50. We 
considered c=-7, applied the MAIC criterion to select k, and estimated the break point using the 
Infimum method.
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β-convergence involves testing that the parameters iµ  and iβ , i=1,2,  
, here in our ap lication ),( lsw  is 
the Qu dratic Spectral window depending on a bandwidth parameter l. Since 
a suitable selection of these elements turns out to be determinant in order to 
prevent inconsistency of the test, we followed the Sul et al. (2005) proposal14. 
Finally, following Kurozumi (2002) and Busetti and Harvey (2002), we 
sel cted the break point which minimizes the residual sum of squares, and 
used the critical values provided by the response surface of Presno and López 
(2003b).
As stated above, the study of stochastic convergence was completed 
with the analysis of the notion of β-convergence. For that, we followed the 
Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) approach. The analysis is based on two 
regressions that are both estimated by OLS. 
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Tb), with 1(.) denoting a indicator function. 
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β-convergence involves testing that the parameters iµ  and iβ , i=1,2,  
 indicate whether the 
fiscal variable is above or below the average/benchmark at times 1 and Tb 
respectively, and 
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 are growth rates before and after the break.
The second regression is based on computing partial sums of yt.
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β-convergence involves testing that h  parameters iµ  iβ , i=1,2,  <0 or vice versa). This can be carried out using 
the statistics provided by Vogelsang (1997, 1998), which are robust to the case 
14 Carrión-i-Silvestre and Sansó (2006) analyzed this method via Monte Carlo simulations, showing its 
good properties in terms of size and power.
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where ut is either an I(0) or I(1) process. In our application we opted for the T
-1/2ty 
and the T-1/2tz statistics, where ty and tz denote the t-statistics for testing the null 
that the individual parameters in regressions (3) and (4) respectively are zero, 
and T is the sample size. The election of these statistics is based on the fact that 
the former has well-defined asymptotic distributions when ut is I(1), but remains 
robust in the presence of I(0) disturbances, while the latter was designed to have 
power and is more appropriate if the errors are known to be I(0), which in our 
study was confirmed from the prior unit root and stationarity tests results.
The critical values are reported in Vogelsang (1997) and Tomljanovich and 
Vogelsang (2002), and depend on whether the break date is assumed known or 
unknown a priori. We assumed this last case and followed the method applied 
by Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) to estimate the break point from the 
data. This consists of estimating regression (3) sequentially for each break year 
with 10 percent trimming (0.1T<Tb<0.9T), computing for each regression T
-1 
multiplied by the Wald statistic for testing the joint hypothesis that 
3 
p.62 
 ( iµ >0 and iβ <0 or vice versa).  
21 µµ =  and 21 ββ = , and selecting the break date that results in the largest normalized 
Wald statistic. 
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d selecting the break date tha  result  in the largest norm lized 
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We complete our research with the study of the strongest concept of 
convergence, long run convergence. This kind of convergence was analysed 
via the LM procedure to test the null hypothesis of zero mean stationarity. 
Concretely, once stationarity around a constant or deterministic convergence 
was detected, we applied the stationarity around zero mean test to the pre- 
and post-break periods. In order to confirm long run convergence, we used the 
critical values reported in Hobijn et al. (2004).  
3 . data and GEnEral rESultS .
3 .1 . data .
Our data are from the Revenue Statistics of the OECD and refer to the 
tax burden and the tax structure or tax mix of the main tax components: 
income, profits and capital gains (IP); social security contributions (SS); taxes 
on property (PR); general taxes on goods and services (GSG); and taxes 
on specific goods and services (GSS)15. Jointly, they represent 90 per cent 
approximately of the tax revenue in the EU-15 in 2005. The sample period 
is from 1965 to 2005.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2 and 3. For illustrative purposes, 
Figures 1 and 3 represent the evolution of the tax burden and the tax mix for 
the European average, and Figures 2 and 4 the evolution of σ-convergence 
measured by the coefficient of variation.   
15 These components are the 1000, 2000, 4000, 5110 and 5120 subdivisions of the OECD tax clas-
sification. We concentrate on the above and do not study the other two main subdivisions -3000-Tax-
es on payroll and workforce and 6000-Other taxes- which only represent the 0.43 and 0.33 per cent 
of total tax revenue respectively in 2005. 
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With respect to the tax burden, from Table 2 and Figure 1 we can see the 
rise in the average of all components except for specific consumption taxes, 
as well the σ-convergence process (Figure 2), especially in social security 
contributions and general consumption taxes. IP and SS account for the 
majority of tax revenue, amounting to 24.81% of GDP in 2005 when total tax 
burden was 39.67%. The tax-to-GDP ratio increased notably from 27.56% in 
1965 because of the extension of welfare and protection systems combined 
with an ageing population, but it has stabilized near 40% since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The Maastricht convergence criteria, the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the extension of the hypothesis of oversized public sectors in Europe 
are some explanations for this change in the trend. 
taBlE 2: tax BurdEn (% of GdP) in thE Eu-15, 1965-2005 .
IP SS PR GSG GSS
1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005
Mean 8.80 13.72 6.16 11.09 1.76 2.07 3.83 7.47 5.97 3.81
Min 1.41 6.96 1.13 1.10 0.62 0.56 0.31 6.00 2.71 2.54
Max 19.21 30.71 11.63 16.33 4.42 4.38 7.92 9.99 10.82 5.36
SD 4.55 5.62 3.31 3.94 1.02 1.05 2.07 1.20 2.07 0.79
CV 0.517 0.410 0.538 0.355 0.578 0.507 0.541 0.161 0.347 0.206
With regard to the tax mix (Table 3), the decline of the taxes on specific 
goods and services, from 23.07% in 1965 to only 9.74% in 2005, was 
absorbed by the remaining categories, except for the taxes on property, 
which decreased slightly. In addition, there is σ-convergence with similar 
characteristics to the tax burden. 
taBlE 3: tax mix (% of total rEvEnuE) in thE Eu-15, 1965-2005 .
IP SS PR GSG GSS
1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005 1965 2005
Mean 30.43 33.81 22.72 28.41 6.67 5.34 13.35 19.04 23.07 9.74
Min 9.12 23.52 3.78 2.19 1.78 1.33 0.10 14.61 11.10 6.79
Max 54.89 61.04 34.17 39.93 15.13 12.00 23.26 25.06 44.01 14.82
SD 11.68 9.07 10.54 9.46 3.71 2.86 6.44 2.76 10.11 2.02
CV 0.384 0.268 0.464 0.333 0.557 0.536 0.482 0.145 0.438 0.208
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fiGurE 1: tax BurdEn for avEraGE Eu-15, 1965-2005 .
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fiGurE 3: tax mix for avEraGE Eu-15, 1965-2005 .
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In short, the dynamics of both the tax burden and the tax composition in the 
EU-15 reveal an increasing common trend, but with a decreasing dispersion, so 
time series analysis will be capable of offering individual paths of convergence 
or divergence16.
3 .2 . SomE GEnEral rEmarkS of thE EmPirical rESultS .
For each of the concepts of convergence that we analyse, Tables 4 and 6, 
which refer to the tax burden and tax mix respectively, summarize the series 
that turned out to be stationary around a level (deterministic convergence) or 
a trend with a break on the basis of the confirmatory analysis using unit root 
and stationarity tests jointly. For series which were confirmed as stationarity 
around a trend (series with “preliminary” stochastic convergence), we analyzed 
the β-convergence condition. This analysis permits the differentiating of paths 
before and after the break, as well as confirming convergence or divergence 
in the preliminary stochastic convergence cases. In Tables 5 and 7 we report 
the conclusions of the β-convergence study following the classification used 
by Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002). Thus, from the analysis of the sign 
and significance of the coefficients µi and βi, C denotes convergence with 
both parameters statistically significant, c denotes convergence but with 
only one parameter statistically significant, D means divergence with both 
parameters statistically significant, d means divergence but with only one 
parameter statistically significant, and finally u denotes that no conclusion 
could be reached as no coefficient is statistically significant. The series which 
converge stochastically respect to the benchmark (“confirmed” stochastic 
convergence) for the tax burden and the tax mix are reported in the last 
column of Tables 4 and 6. Detailed results of the tests are reported in Tables 
A.1-A.3 in the Appendix.
In the next sections, we comment separately on the results for the tax 
burden and the tax mix as they address two different perspectives of tax policy, 
the former how much to collect and the latter how to obtain the revenue from 
the several taxable sources. Before doing so, we offer some general remarks 
about the tests and the results.
From Tables A.1-A.3 in the Appendix, we observe that the break in the 
data estimated for the unit root and stationarity tests and that estimated in 
the β-convergence analysis does not coincide in some series. This issue has 
been emphasized in previous studies which employ these methodologies (for 
instance, Rodríguez, 2006b) and is due to the different methods applied to 
locate the break point.
Results deriving from the T-1/2ty statistic lead in many cases to situations 
where making inferences about convergence or divergence is difficult (cases 
16 In addition, the coefficient of correlation between the measure of σ-convergence of the tax burden 
and tax mix for each tax category is always above 0.9.
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u in Tables 5 and 7). This fact could be explained by the conservative nature 
of the test in the presence of I(0) processes, confirmed by the unit root 
and stationarity tests. In Tables 4 and 6 we include the conclusions about 
convergence from a joint examination of T-1/2ty and T
-1/2tz  statistics.
The estimates of 
3 
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21 µµ =  and 21 ββ = , and selecting the break date that results in the largest normalized 
Wald statistic. 
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 are statistically different from zero for most series. The 
only exceptions are the GSG component - tax burden perspective- of Ireland 
when the United Kingdom is the benchmark, and the IP component -tax mix 
perspective- of Luxembourg with respect to the United Kingdom and Portugal 
with respect to the EU-1517. This means that, in general, the tax magnitudes 
in the European Union did not match with the benchmark in the initial period 
of our study, 1965. 
Tables A.2 and A.3 show more cases of estimates of 
3 
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 ( iµ >0 and iβ <0 or vice versa).  
21 µµ =  and 21 ββ = , and selecting the break date that results in the largest normalized 
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 significantly 
different from zero, even when the results were derived from the less 
conservative T-1/2ty statistic. However, all these countries attained stochastic 
convergence with the benchmark before the break but they did not maintain 
it in the post break years.
Moreover, the results show that the bulk of the convergence process has 
taken place mainly in the period before the break point, and in very few cases 
did the process continue after the break. This fact seems to indicate that in 
the latter years no significant advances in the field of tax policy convergence 
have occurred.
Finally, as remarked by De Juan and Tomljanovich (2005), two caveats 
have to be taken into account when β-convergence analysis is carried out. 
The first is that this methodology does not offer predictive power about the 
future behaviour of the variables. The second rests on the fact that no speed 
of convergence parameter is estimated, so it is not possible to know at what 
moment convergence will be reached.
4 . dEtailEd rESultS and Policy imPlicationS .
4 .1 . rESultS for thE tax BurdEn .
The summary in Table 4 shows that very few cases of long run convergence 
can be observed: Luxembourg with the United Kingdom in IP and Sweden with 
Germany in SS, both in the post break period18. This was as expected due to 
the strong restrictions associated with this type of convergence.
17 However, it should be highlighted that long run convergence was not attained in these cases, and 
we only observe stochastic convergence in the period posterior to the break.
18 Due to the small number of countries with long run convergence, in Table A.1 we do not report the 
values of the LM statistic to test stationarity around zero mean. These values are 0.77 for the case 
of the IP component of Luxembourg with respect to the United Kingdom, and 0.948 for the SS of 
Sweden when Germany is the benchmark.
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The results reveal several cases of deterministic convergence where the 
difference has stabilized around a non-zero constant. The most numerous 
group appears with the United Kingdom in PR. 
As we would expect given its weaker restrictions, there are relatively more 
cases of stochastic convergence. Still, few instances of convergence exist and 
they are mainly concentrated in property and consumption taxes. 
A case which deserves a special mention is taxes on property when the 
United Kingdom is the benchmark. For all these series, both kinds of analysis 
(stationarity-unit root tests and β-convergence analysis) coincide in detecting 
a break date located in the year 1989. The justification is that the United 
Kingdom abolished domestic property taxation based on rates in 1989 
(Scotland) and 1990 (England and Wales), and approved the replacement by 
the controversial poll tax or Community Charge. 
With respect to consumption taxes, a group of six nations converge to 
the EU-15 average. This fact could be expected because of the agreements 
on minimum tax rates on alcohol, tobacco and fuel, but it is striking that the 
convergence paths concentrate in the pre break period –which is located 
mainly at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s- but not in 
the post break years. 
A closer examination of the results from Table 5 highlights some clear 
divergences that reinforce the main finding of the paper, that is, there has been 
no advance in the field of tax policy convergence in the last fifteen or twenty 
years.  
taBlE 4: rESultS from convErGEncE analySiS of thE tax BurdEn .
Series Benchmark
Long run
convergence
Deterministic
convergence
Preliminary
Stochastic
convergence
Stochastic
convergence
IP Germany -
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Sweden
United K.
- -
United K.
Luxembourg
(Post-1975)
Germany
Sweden
Austria
Finland
Greece
Netherlands
Greece (Pre & Post-90)
EU-15 - -
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Portugal
Sweden
Germany (Pre-95)
Ireland (Pre-91)
Portugal (Post-78)
Sweden (Pre-90)
SS Germany
Sweden
(Post-1975)
-
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Ireland (Post-95)
Netherlands (Post-88)
Portugal (Post-91)
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United K. - -
Italy
Spain
Sweden
Italy (Post-91)
EU-15 - Italy
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Belgium (Pre & Post-83)
Netherlands (Post-86)
PR Germany -
Ireland
Denmark
France
Italy
Luxembourg
Portugal
Spain
United K.
Denmark (Post-69)
Portugal (Pre & Post-89)
Spain (Pre-95)
United K. -
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain
France (Pre-89)
Luxembourg (Pre-89)
Netherlands (Pre-89)
Spain (Pre-89)
EU-15 -
Italy
Portugal
Belgium
Denmark
France
Greece
Luxembourg
United K.
Belgium (Pre-95)
France (Pre-91)
GSG Germany -
Austria
Finland
Netherlands
Greece
Portugal
Sweden
Greece (Pre-86)
Portugal (Pre & Post-85)
Sweden (Pre-79)
United K. -
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain
Ireland (Post-78)
Luxembourg (Pre-90)
Netherlands (Post-79)
Spain (Pre & Post-79)
EU-15 -
Finland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Greece
Ireland
Austria (Post-86)
Ireland (Pre & Post-81)
GSS Germany - Sweden
Austria
Denmark
United K.
Austria (Pre-93)
Denmark (Pre-88)
United K. (Pre & post-95)
United K. -
Austria
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
France (Pre & Post-90)
Germany (Pre & Post-95)
Greece (Pre-78)
EU-15 - -
Denmark
Finland
France
Ireland
Luxembourg
Spain
Denmark (Pre-89)
Finland (Pre & Post-74)
France (Pre-94)
Ireland (Pre-91)
Luxembourg (Pre & Post-87)
Spain (Pre-84)
Notes: Pre-year: convergence attained in the period previous to the break, and break date. Post-year: 
convergence attained in the period posterior to the break year, and break date. 
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 taBlE 5: rESultS for β-convErGEncE condition for thE StochaStic convErGEncE of thE tax 
BurdEn .
Series Benchmark Country
T-1/2ty (Tb unknown) T
-1/2tz (Tb unkown)
bTˆPre-break Post- break Pre-break Post- break
IP Germany -
United K.
Austria
Finland
Greece
Netherlands
d
u
c
u
u
u
c
u
d
D
c
u
u
c
c
c
1990
1990
1990
1990
EU-15
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Portugal
Sweden  
d
C
c
d
C
u
u
u
c
u
d
C
C
D
C
D
d
c
C
c
1977
1995
1991
1978
1990
SS
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
D
u
D
D
u
u
c
C
D
d
D
D
u
u
C
C
1995
1997
1988
1991
United K.
Italy
Spain
Sweden
d
u
u
c
d
d
D
c
u
C
D
D
1991
1977
1976
EU-15
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
d
c
d
u
d
c
C
u
d
C
D
u
d
C
C
c
1992
1983
1986
1975
PR
Germany
Denmark
France
Italy
Luxembourg
Portugal
Spain
United K.
u
D
u
d
c
C
D
c
d
u
u
u
u
d
u
D
u
D
C
C
D
C
D
d
u
C
u
D
1969
1991
1991
1998
1989
1995
1989
United K.
France
Germany
Greece
Italy  
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain  
c
d
c
d
c
c
C
u
d
u
u
u
u
u
C
D
d
D
C
c
c
c
D
u
D
d
D
d
1989
1989
1995
1989
1989
1989
1989
EU-15
Belgium
Denmark
France
Greece
Luxembourg
United K.
c
d
C
u
d
D
u
u
u
u
u
u
C
d
C
c
D
d
u
c
c
u
c
D
1995
1988
1991
1995
1998
1989
GSG
Germany
Greece
Portugal
Sweden
c
c
c
u
u
u
c
C
C
u
C
d
1986
1985
1979
71
rEviSta dE Economía mundial 26, 2010, 53-83
tax Policy convErGEncE in Eu: an EmPirical analySiS
United K.
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain
u
C
d
C
u
u
u
u
c
C
d
C
C
c
C
C
1978
1990
1979
1979
EU-15
Austria
Greece
Ireland
d
d
C
u
u
u
d
D
C
C
c
C
1986
1986
1981
GSS
Germany
Austria
Denmark
United K.
c
c
C
u
u
c
C
c
C
u
c
c
1993
1988
1995
United K.
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
u
c
c
C
u
c
c
u
u
C
C
c
c
c
c
c
1974
1990
1995
1978
EU-15
Denmark
Finland
France
Ireland
Luxembourg
Spain
c
c
c
C
C
C
u
c
u
u
u
u
C
c
C
C
C
C
u
C
u
D
C
c
1989
1974
1994
1991
1987
1984
Note: C denotes point estimates consistent with β-convergence that are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level.
c denotes point estimates consistent with β-convergence with only one estimate statistically significant 
at least at the 10% level.
D denotes point estimates consistent with divergence that are statistically significant at least at the 
10% level.
d denotes point estimates consistent with divergence with only one estimate statistically significant 
at least at the 10% level.
u means that no conclusion is possible to be advanced using the available information.
Although our results are not directly comparable with those of Esteve et al. 
(1999) due to differences in methodology (they just apply unit root tests with a 
break and do not take into account the β-convergence condition) and differences 
in the sample periods used (they study 1967-1994), it is worth noting that we 
find less evidence of stochastic convergence. The reason is that we use more 
demanding criteria to confirm the results, which are thus more robust.
4 .2 . rESultS for thE tax mix .
Using the same methodology, the tax mix results are summarized in Table 
6. Long run convergence is confirmed in just one case: the PR component of 
Italy with respect to the EU-15 average in the post-break period19. 
With regard to deterministic convergence, the empirical results again show 
that the biggest group of convergent countries appears in the case of PR when 
19 The value of the LM statistic to test stationarity around zero mean is 0.279.
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the United Kingdom is the benchmark. Concretely, five countries converge 
with the United Kingdom, three of which coincide with the tax burden study: 
Austria, Belgium and Denmark. Again, in all cases the stationarity test detects 
a break around 1989. One must bear in mind that the taxation of the UK is 
heavily based on property, representing about 12 per cent of the tax revenue 
today whereas the EU-15 average is only 5.34 per cent. 
Again, from the preliminary stochastic convergence cases, the Tomljanovich 
and Vogelsang (2002) methodology allows us to isolate the stochastic 
convergence cases (Table 7). If we apply this filter to the preliminary results 
on stochastic convergence, then convergence turns out to be limited to a small 
group of countries. Now, the main cases of convergences are found in the IP 
component, where two countries (Greece and Ireland) converge with the three 
benchmarks, and on the taxes on goods and services, both general and excise. 
It is worth mentioning that five countries converge with Germany in GSS, but 
essentially in the pre-break sample. Finally, as with the tax burden, we conclude 
that there has been some divergence from the benchmarks.
taBlE 6: rESultS from convErGEncE analySiS of thE tax mix .
Series Benchmark Long runconvergence
Deterministic
convergence
Preliminary
Stochastic
convergence
Stochastic
convergence
IP Germany -
Austria
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Greece
Ireland
Sweden
Greece (Pre & Post-93)
Ireland (Pre-92)
Sweden (Pre-76)
United K. -
Netherlands
Spain
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Greece (Pre & Post-92)
Ireland (Pre-91)
Luxembourg (Post-85)
Sweden (Pre&Post-77)
EU-15 - -
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Portugal
Greece (Pre & Post-97)
Ireland (Pre-1992)
Luxembourg (Post-79)
Portugal (Post-78)
SS Germany - Sweden IrelandNetherlands Ireland (Post-95)
United K. - Denmark IrelandLuxembourg
Ireland (Pre-78)
Luxembourg (Pre-82)
EU-15 - BelgiumUnited K.
Ireland
Italy
Sweden
Ireland (Pre & Post-94)
Italy (Post-76)
Sweden (Pre-76)
PR Germany -
Denmark
Portugal
United K.
Belgium
France
Italy
Luxembourg
Belgium (Pre-97)
France (Pre-74)
Italy (Pre-87)
United K. -
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Italy
Finland
Portugal
Spain
Finland (Pre-89)
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EU-15
Italy
(Post-92)
Portugal
Spain
Belgium
France
Luxembourg
United K.
Sweden
Belgium (Pre-94)
France (Pre-88)
Sweden (Pre-86)
GSG Germany -
Finland
Netherlands
Ireland
Sweden
Ireland (Pre-78)
Sweden (Pre-94)
United K. -
Greece
Portugal
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Belgium (Pre-91)
Finland (Pre-91)
Luxembourg (Pre-91)
EU-15 -
Germany
Netherlands
Austria
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Austria (Post-85)
Ireland (Pre-86)
Portugal (Pre-93)
GSS Germany - -
Austria
Finland
Greece
Luxembourg
Sweden
Austria (Pre-93)
Finland (Pre&Post-88)
Greece (Pre-94)
Luxembourg (Pre-79)
Sweden (Pre-94)
United K. -
Denmark
Italy
Sweden
- -
EU-15 -
Finland
Sweden
France
Luxembourg
France (Pre-94)
Luxembourg (Pre-92)
Notes: Pre-year: convergence attained in the period previous to the break, and break date. Post-year: 
convergence attained in the period posterior to the break year, and break date.
taBlE 7: rESultS of thE 
3 
p.62 
 ( iµ >0 and iβ <0 or vice versa).  
21 µµ =  and 21 ββ = , and selecting the break date that results in the largest normalized 
Wald statistic. 
p.64, p.65 
σ-CONVERGENCE 
p.67 
1µ
2µ
p.73 
β -CONVERGENCE convErGEncE condition for thE StochaStic convErGEncE of thE tax mix .
Series Benchmark Country
T-1/2ty (Tb unknown) T
-1/2tz (Tb unkown)
bTˆPre-break Post- break Pre-break
Post- 
break
IP Germany
Greece
Ireland
Sweden
C
C
C
u
u
u
C
C
C
C
d
d
1993
1992
1976
United K.
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
D
C
C
u
C
u
u
u
u
u
D
C
C
c
C
c
C
u
C
C
1991
1992
1991
1985
1977
EU-15
Greece
Ireland
Luxembourg
Portugal
C
C
d
u
u
u
c
u
C
C
D
d
C
c
C
C
1997
1992
1979
1978
SS
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
d
D
c
u
D
d
c
c
1995
1989
United K.
Ireland
Luxembourg
c
C
u
d
C
C
d
c
1978
1982
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EU-15
Ireland
Italy
Sweden
C
d
C
c
C
u
C
D
c
C
C
c
1994
1976
1976
PR
Germany
Belgium
France
Italy
Luxembourg
C
C
c
D
u
u
u
u
C
C
C
d
u
D
c
c
1997
1974
1987
1998
United K.
Finland
Portugal
Spain
c
d
D
d
d
u
C
D
d
D
D
d
1989
1989
1989
EU-15
Belgium
France
Luxembourg
Sweden
United K.
C
C
d
c
D
u
u
u
u
u
C
C
d
C
D
c
c
c
d
D
1994
1988
1998
1986
1989
GSG
Germany
Ireland
Sweden
C
C
u
u
C
C
D
u
1978
1994
United K.
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
Luxembourg
C
C
u
C
u
u
u
u
C
C
c
C
u
u
c
d
1991
1991
1978
1991
EU-15
Austria
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
d
u
C
C
u
u
u
u
d
u
C
C
C
c
d
u
1985
1986
1986
1993
GSS
Germany
Austria
Finland
Greece
Luxembourg
Sweden
c
c
c
c
C
u
c
u
u
u
C
c
C
c
C
u
c
u
d
u
1993
1988
1994
1979
1994
United K. -
EU-15
France
Luxembourg
C
C
u
u
C
C
u
u
1994
1992
Note: C denotes point estimates consistent with β-convergence that are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level.
c denotes point estimates consistent with β-convergence with only one estimate statistically significant 
at least at the 10% level.
D denotes point estimates consistent with divergence that are statistically significant at least at the 
10% level.
d denotes point estimates consistent with divergence with only one estimate statistically significant 
at least at the 10% level.
u means that no conclusion is possible to be advanced using the available information. 
4 .3 . diScuSSion and Policy imPlicationS .
Within the heterogeneous field of cross-national policy convergence (see e.g. 
Knill, 2005), the task of tax convergence is of great importance for European 
integration. The EU must face the trade off between national sovereignty and 
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the single market requisites, and even the prospect of a real political union 
within the new scenario created after the Treaty of the European Union. This 
can be addressed within the framework of classical integration theory or multi-
level governance theory (Jachtenfuchs, 2001). Clearly, the EU is a federation of 
nations and traditional fiscal federalism is not directly valid. As pointed out by 
Alesina et al. (2005), this is due to the lower individual mobility, the fact that 
the transfers within EU countries are much larger than that among them, and 
the higher heterogeneity of preferences.  
In accordance with the results from our approach to tax convergence, the 
empirical evidence reveals that tax policies remain largely national and the vaguely 
designed harmonization measures and other factors such as tax competition are 
not equalizing the tax burden or the tax structure in the EU. Thus, policy makers, 
in the search for an equilibrium between the theoretical results from increasing 
economic integration and the need to maintain the current welfare states with 
increased demands for social protection from citizens, seem to have opted for 
deviating from an hypothetical common path in the tax topics.  
A final issue is whether this absence of policy convergence can affect the 
future of the EU integration. Asymmetries in tax systems must be sufficiently 
bounded to guarantee the performance and benefits from the single market 
and single currency. The recent entry of new Member States with economic, 
fiscal and hence tax differences with respect to the countries that formed the 
EU-15, means that this is a good time to rethink tax policy to avoid a rise 
in tax competition, harmful or not (Halkos and Kyriazis, 2006), which could 
put at risk welfare states and market unity, and by extension the future steps 
towards integration.   
5 . concludinG rEmarkS .
In the framework of European integration, the convergence analysis has 
been applied to income, productivity and prices, but this literature deserved 
little attention to the public sector measures. In this paper we concentrate 
on the fiscal perspective to study the convergence of the disaggregated tax 
burden and the tax structure in the EU-15 over the period 1965-2005 using 
a time series approach. Concretely, we jointly use unit root and stationarity 
tests with a break, and the Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) approach as 
a complementary tool, to evaluate three concepts of convergence: long run, 
deterministic and stochastic, corresponding to stationarity around a zero 
mean, stationarity around a non-zero level and stationarity around a trend 
with β-convergence condition. Germany, the United Kingdom and the EU-15 
average are the benchmarks.
Has there been tax policy convergence in the EU during the last 
decades? As a general conclusion, we have found little empirical evidence 
of convergence to the benchmarks either in the tax burden or in the tax 
mix in spite of harmonization policy or tax competition. The demanding 
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concept of long run convergence is hardly detected and both deterministic 
and stochastic convergence appear with similar frequencies with respect to 
the three benchmarks. Moreover, convergences are more frequent in the pre-
break period -mainly in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s- and rarely 
occur in the post-break years, confirming that convergence has stopped in the 
last two decades. Thus, much of the convergence process occurred at the end 
of the1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s before the establishment of 
the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Single Market, but from then the 
intensity of the process is weaker. Moreover, the finding of a relatively high 
number of divergences reinforces the main conclusions of the paper.  
If we investigate the convergence on a more detailed level, it was asserted 
that the weak catching up process is slightly more frequent in property and 
consumption taxes –general and specific- in the tax burden analysis, whereas 
in the study of the tax mix it is found that the taxes on income and profits 
account for the majority of cases of stochastic convergence.    
These conclusions confirm that the autonomy of countries and the 
differentiated economic structures and political preferences with regard to the 
degree of public intervention prevail over the idea of hard harmonization in the 
fiscal field in the European Union, which lacks a unique fiscal policy beyond a 
soft harmonization in taxation on goods and services and capital income in the 
form of interest and dividends.
As future extensions of this research, the application of panel-data-based 
unit root and stationarity tests allowing for structural breaks could offer new 
insights through the combination of the information in the cross-section and 
time dimensions. In other direction, we are investigating the existence of 
fiscal convergence clubs, which in turn can be further compared with income 
convergence clubs or with social (protection) models established in the 
European Union. The combination of several perspectives -income, government 
expenditure and tax revenue- could help to understand better both diversity 
and clustering inside the EU.  
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APPENDIX. RESULTS FROM TESTS1
TABLE A.1: DETAILED RESULTS OF DETERMINISTIC CONVERGENCE OF TAX BURDEN AND TAX 
MIX. 
  Tax Burden Tax Mix 
Series Benchmark Country ( )δGLSαMZ ηˆ Country ( )δGLSαMZ ηˆ
Luxembourg -12.966c(1977) 0.044 (1974) Austria -11.087c (1977) 0.194(1994) 
Netherlands -12.602c(1997) 0.048(1992) Luxembourg -15.321b (1969) 0.193(1969) 
Sweden -29.510a(1998) 0.045(1991) 
Germany 
United K. -13.429b(1993) 0.194(1996) 
Netherlands -11.792c (1976) 0.044(1972) 
Germany -13.429b 1993) 0.194(1996) Netherlands -12.233c (1969) 0.117(1992) United K. 
Sweden -17.669b 1969) 0.104(2000) Spain -5.503c (1983) 0.108(1978) 
IP 
EU-15 - - - - - - 
Germany - - - Sweden -12.694c (1973) 0.116(1975) 
United K. - - - Denmark -12.093c (1969) 0.075(1971) 
Belgium -18.106b (1968) 0.144(1972) 
SS 
EU-15 Italy -27.482a(1975) 0.064(1975) 
United K. -12.515c (1974) 0.086(1966) 
Denmark -17.468b (1983) 0.083(1983) 
Portugal -11.552c (1989) 0.084(1996) 
Germany Ireland -13.980b(1974) 0.130(1975) 
United K. -18.626b (1981) 0.053(1989) 
Austria -20.901a(1999) 0.068(1991) Austria -13.465b (1968) 0.094(1990) 
Belgium -13.950b(1982) 0.100(1989) Belgium -12.513c (1983) 0.145(1989) 
Denmark -17.052b(1999) 0.028(1991) Denmark -20.501b (1999) 0.032(1991) 
Finland -14.237b(1987) 0.031(1989) Germany -18.626b (1981) 0.053(1989) 
United K. 
Ireland -11.734c(1974) 0.100(1976) Italy -13.276b (1991) 0.122(1988) 
Italy -12.461c(1996) 0.164(1992) Portugal -18.684b (1971) 0.132(1973) 
PR 
EU-15 
Portugal -20.480b(1994) 0.075(1995) Spain -12.719c (1996) 0.243(2000) 
Austria -11.950c(1972) 0.157(1972) Finland -19.163b (1993) 0.031(1991) 
Finland -17.448b(1980) 0.072(1984) 
Germany 
Netherlands -106.45a(1967) 0.152(1970) 
Netherlands -109.17a (1973) 0.150(1970) 
Greece -11.377c (1995) 0.056(1978) United K. Greece -12.995c(1974) 0.151(1978) 
Portugal -20.231b (1966) 0.116(1984) 
Finland -13.935b(1975) 0.072(1973) Germany -18.706 b (1971) 0.113(1972) 
Luxembourg -11.157c(1966) 0.054(1966) 
GSG 
EU-15 
Netherlands -18.524b(1999) 0.137(1990) 
Netherlands -184565a (1976) 0.105(1999) 
Germany Sweden -16.080b(1985) 0.165(1993)  - - 
Austria  -12.759c(1966) 0.092(1973) Denmark -14.223b(1967) 0.103(1967) 
Italy -11.762c (1975) 0.095(1972) 
United K. 
Denmark -15.287b(1982) 0.163(1973) 
Sweden -11.762c (1974) 0.090(1994) 
Finland -17.843b (1981) 0.157(1977) 
GSS 
EU-15 - - - 
Sweden -11.687c (1984) 0.044(1984) 
a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Between parentheses, selected break date. 
Critical values: 
( )δGLSαMZ  test (own elaboration: -20.771; -13.070; -11.043 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively). 
ηˆ  test. Presno and López (2003b). 
                                                
1 Only selected models. Other results are available upon request from authors.  
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